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Abstract
These four books on Sino-Indian relations provide new evidence and 
novel arguments about the origins of the border dispute, the Sino-Indian 
border war of 1962, and the evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Three of 
the four books have made use of newly declassified archival material and 
have thereby challenged existing knowledge about various features of this 
contentious relationship. The books, nevertheless, are of varying quality. 
One or two of them represent the acme of dispassionate scholarship while 
at least one asserts some very partisan claims. That said, they all represent 
a new wave of scholarship on Sino-Indian relations and should be of value 
to those interested in this fraught relationship.
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The two most populous states in the world share a border that is over four thousand kilometres long. This border, with the exception of a small segment, is the subject of a seemingly intractable dispute. The 
disagreement about the alignment of the border contributed to clashes in 
the late fifties and culminated in a brief but bitter border war in 1962.1 
Subsequently, at least two border crises, in 1967 and 1986, have disrupted 
the countries’ relations. In the wake of the border war, ambassadorial-level 
diplomatic relations were suspended and only resumed in 1976.2 Since 1981, 
there have been nineteen rounds of talks between officials of the two states. 
Despite a series of agreements, the most recent of which, the Border Defence 
and Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), was signed in 2013, the dispute is no 
closer to a resolution. Instead in July and August of 2017, military units from 
the two states were involved in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the 
Doklam Plateau near the Bhutan-Tibet-India tri-junction. By the end of 
August, the confrontation was over, but without a formal resolution of the 
casus belli. 
Beyond the border issue, the contentious Sino-Indian relationship also 
has important regional ramifications as the two states are now locked into a 
profoundly competitive relationship within South Asia. Furthermore, their 
rivalry has also spilled over into the Indian Ocean region. 3 It is also evident 
in their attempts to expand their influence in the Indo-Pacific.
What explains the inability of the two parties to resolve this dispute? After 
all, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has managed to settle a series of 
border disputes with a host of other states.4 Also, what explains the expansion 
of the rivalry into adjacent regions? Are the sources of the rivalry rooted in 
the domestic politics of the two states, in ideological competition, or are 
there structural origins? A number of works have previously addressed aspects 
of these questions.5
More recently, however, a series of books have not only uncovered new 
evidence on the origins of the territorial dispute but have also examined the 
role of external powers, and spillover into neighbouring regions. This essay 
____________________
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1  For a dispassionate analysis of the origins of the war see Steven Hoffman, India and the China 
Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
2  B.M. Jain, “India-China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends,” The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93, no. 374 (2004): 253–269.
3  David Brewster, “An Indian Ocean Dilemma: Sino-Indian Rivalry and China’s Strategic 
Vulnerability in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of Indian Ocean Studies 11, no. 1 (2015): 48–59.
4  For a discussion of these settlements see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: 
Cooperation and Conflict In China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
5  See for example, John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century 





























































Disputed Borders and Armed Conflicts: India and China
will evaluate the evidence that has been brought to bear, critique some of 
the arguments, and discuss new directions in the scholarship.
From the Border Dispute to the Border War
A substantial corpus of literature exists on the origins of the Sino-Indian 
border dispute as well as the border war.6 However, some of it is blatantly 
partisan. This is especially the case with much of the secondary work on the 
Sino-Indian border war. In considerable part the bias that characterizes the 
literature stems from Neville Maxwell’s India’s China War, an early account 
of the origins of the war.7 Maxwell squarely blamed the actions of the 
Jawaharlal Nehru government for the war. Specifically, he argued that India’s 
adoption of the “forward policy”—a military strategy that in the words of an 
Indian general had “neither teeth nor tail”—was one of the principal 
precipitants of the conflict. There is little or no question that the policy was 
deeply flawed. It was a textbook case of “compellence failure”: an attempt 
to undo what a perceived aggressor had done without possessing the requisite 
military capabilities to accomplish the task.8 However, as argued persuasively 
in one of the books under discussion, for all its tactical shortcomings the 
“forward policy” was most assuredly not the immediate stimulus for the 
Chinese attack. Instead it was merely the pretext for the well-orchestrated 
PLA attack on India’s northern borders. 
While assigning the blame for the war to India, Maxwell glossed over the 
brutality of the PRC’s occupation of Tibet, its clandestine road-building 
activities in the Himalayas prior to the war, and its chicanery when Nehru 
first raised questions about various maps that depicted as Chinese significant 
chunks of territory that India deemed to be its own. Maxwell’s book became 
received wisdom on the subject for an entire generation of scholars. Thus, 
subsequent scholarship that relied on his book reached some extremely 
dubious conclusions.9 
Access to new archival evidence in India, the United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere has now contributed to a wave of scholarship on the border dispute 
and the Sino-Indian rivalry. Much of this scholarship upends previous work 
on the subject while some components of it are bound to stir new controversy. 
In this context, Berenice Guyot-Rechard’s book, Shadow States: India, China 
____________________
6  See for example, Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and R.A. Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 
(London: Pall Mall, 1963); Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India, 
China and Tibet. 1904–1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966); and John Rowland, A History 
of Sino-Indian Relations (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967). For a perspective from the PRC 
see Lui Xuecheng, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations (Lanham: University Press 
of America, 1994). 
7  Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).
8  For a discussion of the concept of “compellence” see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
9  See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann 
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and the Himalayas, 1910–1962, must be considered a landmark study of the 
origins of the border dispute. The work, based on extensive archival research 
combined with a meticulous effort to comb through copious amounts of 
secondary scholarship, could well become the most invaluable resource for 
those interested in understanding the sources of this seemingly irresolvable 
conflict. 
A novel and intriguing argument undergirds her work. She contends that 
both China and India came to adopt Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty 
following their emergence as independent states. This involved, among other 
matters, a quest for fixed and clearly delineated borders. This endeavour, 
while entirely understandable, was one of the principal reasons why the two 
states swiftly drifted into a confrontation along their Himalayan borders. The 
problem arose along this frontier because the inhabitants of these regions, 
especially in the eastern segment of the frontier, had not recognized the 
authority of particular sovereign entities for generations. Instead they had 
accepted the writ of local authorities and had deemed the boundaries of the 
areas that they lived in to be malleable. As Guyot-Rechard writes, “Neither 
the Qing nor the British empires, predecessors to today’s China and India 
could boast of a concrete state presence in the eastern Himalayas” (12).
Even though she argues that her study is focused on developments on the 
ground, Guyot-Rechard aptly demonstrates how the ebb and flow of the high 
politics of both Qing China and British India induced them to expand their 
administrative reach over these areas, particularly in the eastern Himalayas. 
In turn, they sought to impose the writ on regions which had not previously 
paid suitable obeisance to the capitals of either state. Not surprisingly, these 
efforts called for appropriate cartographic demarcation, which invariably 
brought the two empires into conflict.10 These differences would come to 
the fore in the wake of the Communist revolution of 1949 in China and 
India’s independence in 1947, as both new states sought to consolidate their 
respective standing in erstwhile fluid territories.
It is not easy to summarize in any detail the complex, competitive processes 
that unfolded between the two empires during the long period addressed 
by Guyot-Rechard. Instead a discussion of a few salient moments captures 
the crux of her argument. One of the initial sources of tension between the 
two empires stemmed from British fears of Qing expansionism along the 
frontier. This, in turn, led the British to steadily enhance their administrative 
presence in what was known as the North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA). 
It is important to note that even as China descended into civil war and turmoil 
from the late 1920s to the Communist victory in 1949, the forces of Chiang 
Kai-shek were discussing the significance of winning back China’s “lost 
territories.” These statements caused the British much anxiety and led them 
____________________
10  For a discussion of these activities see Matthew H. Edeney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographic 





























































Disputed Borders and Armed Conflicts: India and China
to step up their activities in India’s northeast. Such moves, at one level, were 
ironic because Chiang was a British ally during World War II. 
The details of British attempts at expanding colonial administration into 
this region constitute much of her analysis. She also shows how these efforts 
generated counter reactions on the part of the Guomindang. Interestingly 
enough, in the 1950s, despite public professions of friendship and amity at 
diplomatic levels, both the successor states, China and India respectively, 
made arduous efforts to try and win the sympathies of the inhabitants of 
their respective border regions. As Guyot-Rechard writes, “Independence 
did not lead to the abandonment of imperial techniques and strategies in 
NEFA; on the contrary, they were crucial to the Nehruvian state’s efforts to 
incorporate the region” (177). These efforts, almost invariably, put the two 
states on a collision course, especially following the Chinese invasion and 
occupation of Tibet. 
India obviously lost the war and the outcome has proven to be quite 
traumatic for both the Indian political and military establishments. The 
memories of the defeat continue to animate Indian military planning and 
strategy. Despite India’s military debacle and its consequent misgivings about 
Chinese strategic intentions, she argues that the PRC faces an uncertain 
future in Tibet. Years of repression and cooptation have not produced 
political order.11 India, for its part, continues to have its own problems of 
governance in the northeast and can only claim patchy progress in securing 
the loyalties of the inhabitants of the region. The only possible shortcoming 
of this otherwise excellent work is that its eventual discussion of India’s and 
China’s attempts to establish political order in their respective segments of 
this region is a little superficial. For a book that has laudable detail in its 
treatment of historical periods, the discussion of more recent political 
developments seems lacking in depth.
Another work that focuses on the fraught politics of this region is Sulmaan 
Wasif Khan’s Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China’s Cold War and the People of the 
Tibetan Borderlands. Khan’s book offers some new evidence on the impact of 
the Cold War in this part of the world. However, it lacks the meticulous 
attention to evidence, both primary and secondary, that characterizes Guyot-
Rechard’s work. Instead it draws heavily from recently declassified PRC 
archives. Such reliance, on its own, should not constitute a significant 
drawback. However, the problem lies in his almost uncritical embrace of the 
PRC’s positions on a series of highly contested and controversial subjects. 
Additionally, the book is also hampered by another problematic feature. 
Considering that this is a work of historical scholarship, many sections rely 
on a rather anecdotal discourse rather than a careful analysis of the 
documentary record. Such a strategy may be appropriate in a work of popular 
____________________
11  For a discussion of the concept of political order see Samuel Huntington, Political Order in 
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history but quite inapt for what purports to be a genuine historical analysis 
of a complex historical period. 
A final shortcoming that mars this book is the lack of a central, undergirding 
thesis. There is no doubt that it deals with the politics of contested regions 
of the Himalayan frontier in the early Cold War years. However, beyond a 
focus on this contestation and an attempt to justify the choices of the PRC it 
is hard to discern a clearly articulated rationale for the work.
From the outset the author seeks to explain (and tacitly justify) the PRC’s 
attempts to control (and subdue) Tibet. In fact, he is at pains to argue that 
the initial Chinese entry into Tibet was mostly a benign affair. To that end, 
he emphasizes the formal promises of fairness of treatment that Chinese 
leaders, especially Mao-Tse-Tung, had made to the Tibetans. These 
assurances, as scholars well know, were honoured in the breach. Monasteries 
were destroyed, Buddhist monks hounded and harassed, and the Tibetan 
population treated with much callousness if not outright brutality.12 Only in 
his discussion of the Khampa rebellion, which erupted in 1956, does Khan 
address the cruelty and harshness of the People’s Liberation Army in dealing 
with the rebels.
His discussion of the Sino-Indian border differences is no better. For 
example, he uncritically trots out Premier Zhou-Enlai’s offer to Prime 
Minister Nehru in 1960 to swap the region of Aksai Chin (which the PRC 
had laid claim to) in exchange for India’s control of the North Eastern 
Frontier Agency. Quite apart from India having to supinely concede to the 
Chinese claim to the Aksai Chin, this offer came at a time when Nehru’s 
room for political maneuver at home had all but closed. Significant border 
clashes had taken place between Indian and Chinese troops in 1959 and 
India’s parliament was in an uproar over these episodes. More to the point, 
these protests were also the result of the obvious shortcomings of Nehru’s 
prior efforts to placate the PRC through diplomatic efforts, his failure to 
disclose that the PLA had made incursions into areas that India deemed to 
be its own, and India’s support for its seating in the United Nations Security 
Council. 
Finally, the book has a somewhat disjointed and choppy quality to its 
organization. In considerable part this problem stems from the 
aforementioned lack of an overarching argument. Consequently, the latter 
sections of the book, which deal with the plight of some nomadic tribes that 
inhabited the frontier and found themselves caught between competing 
sovereign entities, are not explicitly linked with the early chapters dealing 
with Tibet.
The intensity of the Sino-Indian rivalry, of course, increased considerably 
____________________
12  Tsering Sakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1947); also see Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: 





























































Disputed Borders and Armed Conflicts: India and China
after the 1962 border war. How this war came about is one of the key subjects 
addressed in Bertil Lintner’s China’s India War. As the very title suggests, 
Lintner’s book argues that the PRC, not India, was responsible for initiating 
the 1962 conflict. In doing so he quite directly challenges those who have 
argued that Indian rigidity on the settlement of the border question, coupled 
with its adoption of the “forward policy,” led to the war. 
To that end, he constructs a plausible, if somewhat circumstantial, case 
that a combination of a drive to challenge India’s leadership of the Third 
World as well as an opportunity to tackle domestic turmoil had led the PRC 
to launch the war against India in October 1962. His key argument is twofold. 
First, the PRC was unhappy with India’s aspirations (and ability) to emerge 
as a leader of the postcolonial world and had wanted to use its military prowess 
to diminish India’s evolving stature in the global arena. Consequently, after 
inflicting an unequivocal military defeat on India and firmly establishing 
control over the Aksai Chin (which enabled it to connect Tibet with the 
province of Xinjiang), it was content to withdraw from other areas that it 
had seized in the war.
Second, the conflict also stemmed from the imperatives of Chinese 
domestic politics. The disastrous domestic socio-economic consequences of 
Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” policies, Lintner argues, had a considerable 
influence on the timing of the attack on India. The border war and its 
attendant propaganda enabled Mao to sideline powerful domestic opponents 
who had highlighted the abject failures of his ill-conceived scheme of 
backyard industrialization under the aegis of the policies of the “Great Leap 
Forward.”13 Lintner also reveals that the PLA had carefully gathered evidence 
of India’s military preparedness along the Himalayan border and was more 
than aware of its limitations. More to the point, it had carried out extensive 
preparations for a determined assault. Consequently, the popular belief that 
the Indian “forward policy” constituted the immediate precipitant of the 
war is actually little more than a partisan canard.
The evidence that Lintner has gathered to challenge some common and 
widespread assumptions about the origins of the war is impressive. However, 
he could have adduced more evidence when challenging the arguments of 
a pro-Chinese British historian, Alastair Lamb, on matters pertaining to the 
alignment of certain disputed Himalayan borders. Here Lintner relies mostly, 
if quite deftly, on secondary evidence. To firmly refute Lamb’s claims it would 
have been helpful if Lintner could have produced new archival evidence.
Subsequent parts of his book turn to a discussion of the PRC’s involvement 
in promoting internal discord in India through its support for Maoist 
movements, to the PRC’s machinations to reduce India’s influence in the 
____________________
13  Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62 
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Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal and finally in Burma (Myanmar). 
These are mostly quite straightforward but do offer some intriguing granular 
details of the PRC’s attempts to undermine India’s position in these states. 
The books discussed so far in this essay focus mostly on the early years of 
the troubled Sino-Indian relationship. Frederic Grare’s volume, India Turns 
East, however, deals with how the rivalry has now expanded in terms of its 
geographic scope. Previous scholarship, such as Isabelle Saint Mezard’s 
excellent analysis, had primarily focused on the economic dimensions of 
India’s “Look East” policy: an attempt to engage the states of Southeast Asia 
after a long period of considerable neglect. Grare, on the other hand, 
explicitly examines the strategic imperatives that have driven this turn 
eastward.14 In this context, he makes it abundantly clear that he believes the 
PRC’s expanding reach into this region was a significant driver of India’s 
shift in that direction in the 1990s.
In making the argument about the role of strategic competition as one 
of the key motivations underlying India’s policy shift he does not dismiss the 
importance of economic considerations. However, he is at pains to stress 
that India’s fitful embrace of more market-oriented policies in the early 1990s 
alone cannot adequately explain its decision to engage with the states of 
Southeast Asia. 
Grare’s book is superbly organized, well-argued and based on careful 
research. Given that he is dealing with a highly contemporaneous subject 
he has been unable to draw on archival sources. However, he has made 
extensive use of a range of sources that are available in the public domain. 
The book also demonstrates a very supple grasp of the pertinent secondary 
literature upon which Grare rests his analysis.
Grare deftly recapitulates the evolution of Sino-Indian relations over the 
past several decades and demonstrates how the PRC’s growing capabilities 
and assertiveness pose both immediate and long-term threats to India’s 
national security. In this discussion, he also shows how Pakistan, for all 
practical purposes, became a strategic surrogate for the PRC in South Asia. 
As a consequence, Indian security planners have to be acutely mindful of 
the implications of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. 
Most importantly, he highlights that Indian policy makers have yet to 
arrive at a clear consensus regarding how best to deal with the enhanced 
threats that the country faces from the PRC. In this context, he may have 
devoted some space to the abject lack of suitable policy expertise in India 
on the PRC and its adverse impact on the policy-making process. Given the 
security challenge that the PRC poses, the paucity of appropriate policy-
relevant knowledge about the PRC is downright puzzling. 
____________________






























































Disputed Borders and Armed Conflicts: India and China
The lack of a policy consensus about how best to deal with the threat from 
the PRC is also evident in India’s relations with the United States. Grare quite 
accurately sums up the three strands of Indian views about this strategy. 
These range from a willingness to dovetail Indian policy with that of the 
United States, avoiding any such alignment, and finally pursuing a pragmatic 
strategic partnership without wholly embracing the American strategy.
His discussion of the origins of and India’s reactions to the US 
“rebalancing” strategy toward Asia, which was undertaken during President 
Obama’s second term, is quite supple. However, the entire discussion has 
recently been overtaken by events. It is far from self-evident that the Trump 
administration will sustain the key elements of that strategy. Indeed the 
Trump regime’s entire policy orientation toward the region appears both 
incoherent and muddled, thereby leaving both allies and the principal likely 
adversary, the PRC, somewhat confused about what can reasonably be 
expected from the United States during his time in office. From the 
standpoint of policy makers in New Delhi, this is a matter of no minor 
concern, especially as the PRC has evinced no inclination to contain its 
footprint across much of the Indo-Pacific. On the contrary, it has ramped 
up its efforts to expand its influence, especially through the “belt and road” 
initiative, a series of infrastructural projects with significant strategic 
ramifications, designed to connect various parts of the PRC with a host of 
states in adjoining regions.15 The most troubling component of the initiative, 
from the standpoint of New Delhi, is obviously the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC), which is expected to pass through disputed territory in 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir.16
Another important facet of the book that deserves comment is Grare’s 
thoughtful exposition of a number of other key relationships that India has 
sought to forge in the recent past, as it attempts to cope with the PRC’s rising 
profile in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, Grare dwells on India’s ties with a 
number of states in the Indo-Pacific but very specifically with Burma 
(Myanmar), Australia, and Japan. His discussion of the evolution of India’s 
ties with each of these states is quite robust and nuanced, even if some of 
the material he covers is familiar to specialists on the subject. 
All these books, to varying degrees, have yielded new evidence and 
provided novel analytic perspectives on various aspects of the Sino-Indian 
rivalry. None, however, have any explicit theoretical assumptions guiding 
their analyses. That said, the books by Grare and Lintner have an implicit 
theoretical postulate: namely, that the roots of the Sino-Indian rivalry are 
mostly structural. The two states are both large, they have divergent self-
____________________
15  Tom Phillips, “The $900 billion question: What is the Belt and Road initiative?” The Guardian, 
11 May 2017.
16  Adrija Roychowdhury, “CPEC: The bumpy new trade route between China and Pakistan,” The 
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images, they have long vied for leadership within Asia and beyond, and they 
share a common disputed border. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
rivalry has actually intensified as economic growth and concomitantly military 
capabilities have increased. Beyond the structural factors that have driven 
the rivalry, the emergence of particular regimes, the rise of specific 
personalities to positions of leadership, and domestic politics in both states 
have also affected the course of the relationship. 17
The extant literature on rivalries in the field of international politics 
suggests a number of possible pathways for the ending of a rivalry. Some end 
in the military (or political) victory of one state, others end because domestic 
circumstances in one or both states contribute to a rapprochement, while 
still others conclude because one state simply concedes defeat.18 In the Sino-
Indian context none of these venues for rivalry termination seem likely at 
least in the foreseeable future. Consequently, how this rivalry evolves in the 
coming decades will, in considerable measure, determine the political and 
strategic landscape of Asia in the coming decades.
Indiana University, Bloomington, USA, December 2017
____________________
17  On this point see Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: 
Do Domestic Politics Matter?” in Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games, 
eds. Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011).
18  Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson, and Sumit Ganguly, How Rivalries End (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
